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GLADUE AT TWENTY: GLADUE PRINCIPLES 




As the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in R v Gladue, the estrangement of Canada’s 
Indigenous peoples from the Canadian justice system is a national crisis—a crisis of which 
overincarceration is merely one symptom.1 This reality has been emphasized by scholars such 
 *  Of the Ontario Bar; Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. Thanks to Jaclyn 
Salter and Elizabeth Taylor for research assistance and to Jocelyn Stacey, Camden Hutchinson, Candice 
Telfer, Li-Wen Lin, and Naiomi Metallic for comments on a draft.
1.  R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 171 DLR (4th) 385 [Gladue]. See, for example, Gladue at paras 61 (“the 
excessive imprisonment of aboriginal people is only the tip of the iceberg insofar as the estrangement of 
the aboriginal peoples from the Canadian criminal justice system is concerned”) and 64 (“These findings 
cry out for recognition of the magnitude and gravity of the problem, and for responses to alleviate it. The 
figures are stark and reflect what may fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system.”)
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as Larry Chartrand, who in 2001 wrote that “This [overincarceration] is not disputed and is 
supported by countless national and provincial commissions and inquiries” and attributed it 
in part to “systemic discrimination in the justice system.”2 Similarly, James (Sákéj) Youngblood 
Henderson emphasizes the roots of this crisis in colonization, noting that “More than two 
decades of commissions, inquiries, reports, special initiatives, conferences and books have 
established the totalizing effects of colonization on Aboriginal peoples in Canada.”3
Indeed, the justice system reinforces the adverse impacts of colonization. Henderson 
puts it clearly:
Indigenous peoples know this crisis more as feeling than as theory. They have 
to build their lives around injustices and pollution that they cannot heal, 
undermining their lives and dignity. In the context of a failed justice system 
that we do not control, we are struggling to free our minds and our peoples 
from the worst manifestations of the Eurocentric colonial context.4
Likewise, Chartrand observes that “To be a member of a Nation of people who have been 
humiliated, discriminated against, abused and victimized by England and Canada is deeply 
disconcerting.”5 Despite Gladue and its progeny, Chartrand argues that “in the case of claims 
by Aboriginal peoples for justice the Supreme Court of Canada has largely been a source of 
injustice.”6 Chartrand also demonstrates “blatant ignorance on the part of the government of 
Canada” as to the impact of the criminal law on Indigenous persons.7 These problems are often 
met with weak and insufficient responses. Indeed, in her study of colonization and the justice 
system, Lisa Monchalin dismisses Gladue, and the provision of the Criminal Code underlying 
it, as mere “tinkering.”8
In the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the legal profession and its 
regulators have focused on the training and education of lawyers and law students, particularly 
in “intercultural competency,” as emphasized in Calls to Action 27 and 28.9 For example, 
in 2018 the Advocates’ Society, the Indigenous Bar Association, and the Law Society of Ontario 
jointly published a Guide for Lawyers Working with Indigenous Peoples, which observed—
2.  Larry N Chartrand, “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LJ 449 at 
454, 457 [Chartrand, “Mandatory Sentencing”].
3.  James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, “Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness” (2002) 1 Indigenous 
LJ 1 at 24 [citations omitted].
4.  Ibid at 24 [citations omitted].
9.  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Calls to Action (Winnipeg: The Commission, 2015), 
online: National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation <nctr.ca/reports.php>. Call to Action 27: “We 
call upon the Federation of Law Societies of Canada to ensure that lawyers receive appropriate cultural 
competency training, which includes the history and legacy of residential schools, the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaties and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law, and 
Aboriginal–Crown relations. This will require skills-based training in intercultural competency, conflict 
resolution, human rights, and anti-racism.” Call to Action 28: “We call upon law schools in Canada to 
require all law students to take a course in Aboriginal people and the law, which includes the history and 
legacy of residential schools, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaties 
and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law, and Aboriginal–Crown relations. This will require skills-based 
training in intercultural competency, conflict resolution, human rights, and anti-racism.”
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among other things—that “there is no such thing as a culturally neutral practice of law.”10 
However, this training and education focus is important but incomplete: The journey toward 
reconciliation will also involve law societies’ re-examination of their relationship with and 
regulation of Indigenous lawyers.
A key facet of the regulation of Indigenous lawyers is the disciplinary process, including 
the determination of penalties. It is in this respect that the applicability of Gladue principles 
warrants consideration.
In the twenty years since Gladue, Gladue principles have been extended well beyond 
their origin in criminal sentencing.11 However, there have been only two matters in which 
these principles have been explicitly applied by professional discipline tribunals—both in 
disciplining lawyers.12 Neither of these decisions were judicially reviewed, which means no 
court has stated whether or not this extension is appropriate. Moreover, these discipline 
decisions are not considered in the leading treatise on lawyer discipline.13 As a result, there is 
doctrinal uncertainty.
In this article, I address this doctrinal uncertainty by analyzing these disciplinary decisions 
and tracing the appellate extensions of Gladue that preceded them and the decisions of 
10.  Advocates’ Society, Indigenous Bar Association & Law Society of Ontario, Guide for Lawyers Working 
with Indigenous Peoples (Toronto: AS, IBA & LSO, 2018) at 10, online: <https://lawsocietyontario.
azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/g/guide_for_lawyers_working_with_indigenous_peoples_
may16.pdf>.
11.  Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 718.2(e). I also note statutory extensions of Gladue to sentencing regimes 
outside the Criminal Code. See, for example, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make 
related and consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 15, s 63(23), adding subsection c.1 to s 
203.3 of the Code of Service Discipline, being Part III of the National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5: “all 
available punishments, other than imprisonment and detention, that are reasonable in the circumstances 
and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, 
with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.” (However, this was first read in by 
Pelletier J in R v Levi-Gould, 2016 CM 4003 at para 13. Thanks to Benjamin Ralston for bringing this 
case to my attention.) See also Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1 [YCJA], s 38(2)(d): “all available 
sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all young 
persons, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal young persons,” which was missing 
from the predecessor Young Offenders Act, RSC 1985, c Y-1. The presence of this provision in the YCJA is 
less a true extension of Gladue than merely avoiding a legislative gap between the YCJA and the Criminal 
Code. See Kent Roach & Jonathan Rudin, “Gladue: The Judicial and Political Reception of a Promising 
Decision” (2000) 42 Can J Criminology 355 at 357: “More troubling, the federal government initially 
decided not to include an equivalent of s 718.2(e) in its proposed Youth Criminal Justice Act. This would 
have produced the absurd result that judges would have had more legal resources to avoid placing adult 
rather than teenaged aboriginal offenders in jail.”
12.  While I would distinguish police discipline from professional discipline, in this respect see Commissaire à 
la déontologie policière v Ross, 2003 CanLII 57332 (QC CDP) at para 330, in which the decision maker 
seemed to hold that Gladue principles apply but was not specific about how. At the penalty hearing 
the police officers argued that Gladue principles should apply to penalty determination (Police Ethics 
Commissioner v Ross, 2003 CanLII 57340 at para 24 (QC CDP): “This is a case involving ‘native’ police 
officers and ‘native’ civilians in a ‘native’ community with unique experiences with law enforcement. The 
Committee can look to Gladue, a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, for sentencing principles 
in matters dealing with aboriginal peoples”) but it is unclear whether and how the decision maker took 
Gladue principles into account.
13.  Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto: Thomson 
Reuters Canada 1993) (loose-leaf updated 2019, release 4) at ch 26, 26.17 at 26-42 to 26-62.
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the Supreme Court of Canada that followed them to determine whether these disciplinary 
decisions were correct in applying Gladue principles.
However, despite the spread of Gladue principles, there are no settled legal criteria or legal 
tests for when Gladue principles should be extended beyond the context of criminal sentencing. 
Thus, to demonstrate that Gladue principles properly apply to lawyer discipline, I must 
first establish a legal test for the extension of Gladue principles to new contexts. I identify 
four possible approaches to the extension of Gladue principles. Three of these approaches 
are identifiable in the decisions of appellate courts, while the fourth can be derived from a 
common theme among some of these decisions. Of these four approaches, two would apply 
to all discipline of Indigenous lawyers and one would apply depending on the nature of the 
particular conduct at issue. I ultimately conclude that while appellate guidance is desirable to 
confirm which of these four approaches, alone or in combination, is correct, Gladue principles 
should generally be applied to discipline of Indigenous lawyers.
This article is organized in three parts. I begin in Part I with an analysis of the reasons 
given in these lawyer disciplinary decisions, set within the context of background information 
on Indigenous lawyers in Canada and the purposes of law society discipline. Then, in Part II, 
I trace the extension of Gladue principles from the Criminal Code through to these disciplinary 
decisions to identify my four approaches to when Gladue principles should be extended to 
contexts outside criminal sentencing. I also consider the impact of decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada subsequent to these disciplinary decisions. In Part III, I consider how these 
four approaches interact and explain why Gladue principles should generally be applied to the 
discipline of Indigenous lawyers.
As a starting point, it is important to crystallize the meaning of the phrase “Gladue 
principles.” While the Supreme Court of Canada often refers to “Gladue principles,”14 
suggesting that the phrase is a term of art, less often does it define what precisely those 
principles are or mean. As my analysis below will demonstrate, this ambiguity about what 
exactly Gladue principles are informs ambiguity about how they apply in contexts beyond 
criminal sentencing.
The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Ipeelee held that
Gladue directs sentencing judges to consider: (1) the unique systemic and 
background factors which may have played a part in bringing the particular 
Aboriginal offender before the courts; and (2) the types of sentencing 
procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances 
for the offender because of his or her particular Aboriginal heritage 
or connection.15
(In addition, the court held that “the Gladue principles direct sentencing judges to abandon 
the presumption that all offenders and all communities share the same values when it comes to 
sentencing and to recognize that, given these fundamentally different world views, different or 
alternative sanctions may more effectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a particular 
14.  See, for example, R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 [Ipeelee] at paras 34, 63, 64, 74, 84, 87; R v Kokopenace, 2015 
SCC 28 at para 98, rev’g 2013 ONCA 389 [Kokopenace SCC, Kokopenace CA].
15.  Ipeelee, supra note 14 at para 72, citing Gladue, supra note 1 at para 66.
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community.”16) The court in Gladue specified, among these unique factors, that “many 
aboriginal people are victims of systemic and direct discrimination, many suffer the legacy of 
dislocation, and many are substantially affected by poor social and economic conditions.”17 
Similarly, the court in Ipeelee, quoting from the Report of the Manitoba Public Inquiry into 
the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, referred to “cultural oppression, social 
inequality, the loss of self-government and systemic discrimination, which are the legacy of the 
Canadian government’s treatment of Aboriginal people.”18 Chartrand likewise states that “the 
inclusion of section 718.2(e) in the Criminal Code and the special direction given to sentencing 
judges to consider the unique circumstances of Aboriginal peoples is a response and an 
acknowledgment by government that Aboriginal crime is not simply a question of individual 
circumstances but rather the result of complex social factors.”19
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kokopenace used the phrase “Gladue 
principles” interchangeably with “the estrangement of Aboriginal peoples from the criminal 
justice system.”20 This usage is consistent with the reasons in Gladue, which emphasized not 
only overincarceration but also “the greater problem of aboriginal alienation from the criminal 
justice system.”21
Thus, for my purposes, Gladue principles may be described as a recognition of the unique 
circumstances of Indigenous persons, particularly their alienation from the criminal justice 
system, and the impact of discrimination, cultural oppression, dislocation, and poor social and 
economic conditions.
I INDIGENOUS LAWYERS, LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND 
GLADUE PRINCIPLES
In this section I analyze the reasoning in the two lawyer disciplinary decisions that have 
applied Gladue principles, as well as a third decision in which the panel acknowledged 
that Gladue principles could apply but declined to do so. I start, however, by considering 
the situations and experiences of Indigenous lawyers in Canada and then by setting out the 
purposes of law society discipline and the factors going to penalty.
A. Indigenous Lawyers in Canada
16.  Ipeelee, supra note 14 at para 74.
17.  Gladue, supra note 1 at para 68. See also Marie Manikis, “Towards Accountability and Fairness for 
Aboriginal People: The Recognition of Gladue as a Principle of Fundamental Justice That Applies to 
Prosecutors” (2016) 21:1 Can Crim L Rev 173 at 183, defining Gladue as “the principle that requires 
public agencies to take into account the status of Aboriginal people and their backgrounds when making 
decisions that can affect their liberty interests.” See also Manikis at 184: “the Gladue principle entails that 
special consideration is attributed to Aboriginal status in every decision by a state agency that has the 
potential effect of undermining an Aboriginal person’s life, liberty or security interests.”
18.  Ipeelee, supra note 14 at para 83, quoting Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and 
Aboriginal People, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vol 1, The Justice System and 
Aboriginal People (Winnipeg: The Inquiry, 1991) at 86.
19.  Chartrand, “Mandatory Sentencing,” supra note 2 at 462–463 [emphasis added].
20.  Kokopenace SCC, supra note 14 at para 97.
21.  Gladue, supra note 1 at para 65.
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A 2016 study reported that Indigenous lawyers comprise approximately 1 percent of 
the legal profession in Canada,22 but there is considerable variation among the provinces. 
According to recent statistics from the Law Society of Ontario, Indigenous lawyers comprise 
roughly 1.5 percent of the Ontario bar, which is about half of their proportion in the general 
population.23 Indigenous lawyers comprise about 0.5 percent of the Quebec bar24 and about 
5.5 percent of the Manitoba bar.25 (Similarly, Indigenous lawyers as a proportion of the legal 
profession by province varied from a low of 0.4 percent in Quebec to a high of 4.9 percent in 
Saskatchewan as of 2006.26)
As Sonia Lawrence and Signa Daum Shanks have noted, “the number of Indigenous 
lawyers [in Canada] doubled at some point in the 1990s.”27 Similarly, a 2009 report from the 
Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) concluded that “the Aboriginal bar in Ontario consists 
of mostly recently called lawyers…approximately 65% of self-identifying Aboriginal lawyers 
have been called since 2001.”28
As several commentators recognize, Indigenous lawyers may face a challenge in reconciling 
their Indigeneity with their status as legal professionals “given the centrality of the Canadian 
legal system in the ongoing oppression of Indigenous Canadians.”29 As Lawrence and Daum 
22.  Canadian Centre for Diversity and Inclusion, Diversity by the Numbers: The Legal Profession (Calgary 
and Toronto: CCDI, 2016) at 27, online: <https://ccdi.ca/media/2019/dbtn_tlp_2016.pdf> [1.06 percent]. 
According to figures from Tennant, in 1992 Indigenous lawyers made up 0.8 percent of the legal profession, 
which was approximately one-third of their proportion of the general population (2.3 percent): Chris 
Tennant, “Discrimination in the Legal Profession, Codes of Professional Conduct and the Duty of Non-
Discrimination” (1992) 15:2 Dal LJ 464 at 469 [citation omitted].
23.  Law Society of Ontario, Statistical Snapshot of Lawyers in Ontario (Toronto: LSO, 2017) at 2, Table 1 
(1.5 percent and 2.8 percent), online: <http://annualreport.lso.ca/2017/common/documents/Snapshot-
Lawyers18_English.pdf> [LSO Snapshot].
24.  Barreau du Québec, Rapport annuel 2018–2019 (Montréal: Barreau du Québec, 2019) at 13, online: 
<https://www.barreau.qc.ca/media/1885/2018-2019-rapport-annuel.pdf> [134 of 27,581 (0.5 percent)].
25.  Law Society of Manitoba, 2019 Annual Report (Winnipeg: LSM, 2019) at 8, online: <http://www.
lawsociety.mb.ca/Plone/publications/annual-reports/2019%20Annual%20Report.pdf/view> [114 of 2094 
(5.4 percent)].
26.  Michael Ornstein, Racialization and Gender of Lawyers in Ontario (Toronto: LSUC, 2010) at 16, Table 11, 
online: <https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/r/racialization_gender_report.
pdf>. The three territories reported a pooled proportion of 13.7 percent, but that figure combined both 
Indigenous and racialized lawyers. On the need for better demographic data, see Sabrina Lyon & Lorne 
Sossin, “Data and Diversity in the Canadian Justice Community” (2014) 11 JL & Equality 85.
27.  Sonia Lawrence & Signa A Daum Shanks, “Indigenous Lawyers in Canada: Identity, Professionalization, 
Law” (2015) 38:2 Dal LJ 503 at 504. See also Law Society of Upper Canada, Final Report—Aboriginal Bar 
Consultation (Toronto: LSUC, 2009) at paras 1–3, online: <https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/
lso/media/legacy/2009-final-report-of-the-indigenous-bar-consultation_1.pdf> [LSUC ABC Report].
28.  LSUC ABC Report, supra note 27 at para 37.
29.  Lawrence & Daum Shanks, supra note 27 at 513. See also Patricia A Monture, “Now That the Door Is 
Open: First Nations and the Law School Experience” (1990) 15:2 Queen’s LJ 179 at 189: “The work 
of Canadian legal scholars, the judiciary, politicians, and in fact all those involved with the shaping of 
Canada as a nation state, have actively, by omission or commission, participated in the direct oppression 
of First Nations.” See also Jeffrey G Hewitt, “Decolonizing and Indigenizing: Some Considerations for Law 
Schools” (2016) 33:1 Windsor YB Access Just 65 at 68: “Law schools produce legal actors and, through 
this production line, serve as a site of colonization because in Canada law has been, and continues to be, a 
vehicle to oppress Indigenous peoples” [citations omitted].
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Shanks put it, “Indigenous lawyers occupy a complicated space.”30 Tracey Lindberg describes 
this tension in terms of language: “As students of law, Aboriginal people are in the position 
of having to learn an unfamiliar language while attempting at the same time to retain their 
own.”31 Similarly, Henderson writes that “Indigenous lawyers have had to resist the European 
categories and methods and redraw the map and consequences of the law of colonization.”32 
He elaborates that “Eurocentrism and colonial thought still imprisons colonized Indigenous 
peoples and Indigenous lawyers…[who] seek to practice law, law reform, and empower our 
communities and peoples within the toxic parameters of our cognitive prison of our legal 
consciousness.”33 (At the same time, that colonized knowledge can be applied for change: 
“by using borrowed Eurocentric languages and skills, Indigenous lawyers can participate in 
unraveling Eurocentric visions.”34) Indeed, Constance Backhouse argues that “the very concept 
of professionalism has been inextricably linked historically to masculinity, whiteness, class 
privilege, and Protestantism”—as well as Eurocentric colonization.35
Discrimination is a reality for many Indigenous lawyers and law students. Not surprisingly, 
the 2009 LSUC report concluded that discrimination was a major factor in the experience 
of Indigenous lawyers in Ontario.36 Similarly, although somewhat dated, a 2000 survey of 
Indigenous lawyers by the Law Society of British Columbia found that 76 percent reported 
“discriminatory barriers” in law school, as did 81 percent in practice but only 59 percent 
while articling.37
While the discrimination faced by Indigenous lawyers shares some elements with racism 
generally, the two are not the same. For example, Lawrence and Daum Shanks explain:
Indigeneity should not be conflated with other racializations. But, the ubiquity 
of racism directed at Indigenous people and the extent to which this figures in 
personal narratives mean that the treatment of Indigenous peoples and nations 
by colonial and imperial projects cannot be entirely separated from racial 
projects more generally.38
30.  Lawrence & Daum Shanks, supra note 27 at 504–505.
31.  Tracey Lindberg, “What Do You Call an Indian Woman with a Law Degree? Nine Aboriginal Women 
at the University of Saskatchewan College of Law Speak Out” (1997) 9:2 CJWL 301 at 321. See also 
305–306: “Many of us recognized that we were being indoctrinated and we fought this indoctrination in 
different ways.”
32.  Henderson, supra note 3 at 9.
33.  Ibid at 14, 15.
34.  Ibid at 54.
35.  Constance Backhouse, “Gender and Race in the Construction of ‘Legal Professionalism’: Historical 
Perspectives” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the 
Canadian Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) 126 at 128. See also 132–133 on Indigenous 
lawyers and prospective lawyers.
36.  LSUC ABC Report, supra note 27 at para 41. On the experiences of Indigenous law students, see generally 
Monture, supra note 29 and Lindberg, supra note 31.
37.  Law Society of British Columbia, Aboriginal Law Students Working Group, Addressing Discriminatory 
Barriers Facing Aboriginal Law Students and Lawyers (Vancouver: LSBC, 2000) at 17, 34-35, 
38-39, online: <https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/Website/media/Shared/docs/publications/reports/
AboriginalReport.pdf>.
38.  Lawrence & Daum Shanks, supra note 27 at 509.
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Similarly, the final report of the Challenges Faced by Racialized Licensees Working Group 
of the Law Society of Upper Canada noted “that Indigenous peoples face barriers that 
are unique to Indigenous licensees and barriers that are shared by both racialized and 
Indigenous licensees.”39
In this context, it would not be surprising if at least some Indigenous lawyers have 
complicated relationships with and attitudes toward law societies as regulators.40 Little 
information is available on the experiences of Indigenous lawyers with law society 
investigations and discipline. While there are no statistics that directly suggest Indigenous 
lawyers are disciplined at a greater level than lawyers overall, they are more likely than lawyers 
overall to practise as sole practitioners (in Ontario, 24 versus 21 percent) or in small firms of 
fewer than five lawyers (of those lawyers practising in firms, 42 versus 29 percent)—groups 
that are generally considered to be investigated and disciplined at a higher rate than lawyers 
in larger firms.41 Of the ten reported penalty decisions over the last twenty years in which the 
lawyer is identifiable as Indigenous, the reasons in only the three I will discuss below consider 
Gladue principles.42 (As for good character hearings for admission to the bar, of the three 
decisions in the last twenty years in which the applicant is identifiable as Indigenous none 
considers Gladue principles.43)
39.  Law Society of Upper Canada, Challenges Faced by Racialized Licensees Working Group, Working 
Together for Change: Strategies to Address Issues of Systemic Racism in the Legal Professions (Toronto: 
LSUC, 2016) at para 18, online: <https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/w/
working-together-for-change-strategies-to-address-issues-of-systemic-racism-in-the-legal-professions-final-
report.pdf>.
40.  See, for example, Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2019 ONLSTA 19 at paras 7–8, where the lawyer 
argued that the Law Society Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over Indigenous lawyers, on unceded land, or both. 
Consider also the difficult experience of an Indigenous lawyer applicant convincing the LSUC to allow her 
to wear traditional regalia for her call to the bar: Duncan McCue, “First Nations Law Student Gets OK 
to Wear Regalia to Call to Bar in Ontario” CBC News (22 June 2015), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
indigenous/first-nations-law-student-gets-ok-to-wear-regalia-to-call-to-bar-in-ontario-1.3123665>.
41.  LSO Snapshot, supra note 23 at 7, Table 5a, and 8, Table 5b. Again, there is arguably a need for better 
data. See note 26 and accompanying text. Better data could quantify the degree to which sole practitioners 
and small-firm lawyers are investigated and disciplined and could also reveal whether Indigenous licensees 
are being overinvestigated and overdisciplined.
42.  Law Society of Alberta v Willier, 2018 ABLS 22, [2018] LSDD No 244 [Willier]; Law Society of 
Saskatchewan v Winegarden, 2017 SKLSS 8, [2017] LSDD No 262; Law Society of Upper Canada v 
Batstone, 2017 ONLSTH 34, [2017] LSDD No 39 [Batstone]; Law Society of Upper Canada v Batstone, 
2015 ONLSTH 214, [2015] LSDD No 263; Law Society of Alberta v Mirasty, 2016 ABLS 21, [2016] 
LSDD No 109, aff’d 2016 ABLS 58, [2017] LSDD No 135 [Mirasty, Mirasty Appeal]; Law Society of 
Alberta v Shanks, 2013 ABLS 21, [2013] LSDD No 214; Law Society of Upper Canada v Terence John 
Robinson, 2013 ONLSAP 18, [2013] 4 CNLR 129, [2013] LSDD No 75, var’g 2012 ONLSHP 115, [2012] 
LSDD No 130 [LSUC v Robinson AP, LSUC v Robinson HP]; The Law Society of Manitoba v Nadeau, 
2013 MBLS 4 [Nadeau]; Law Society of British Columbia v Bauder, 2013 LSBC 7, [2013] LSDD No 17; 
Law Society of Alberta v Hendricks, [2005] LSDD No 4. (These are the ten decisions that use terms such 
as “Indigenous” or “Aboriginal” or “Métis” or “First Nations.” There may well be additional decisions 
regarding Indigenous lawyers in which the lawyer was not identifiable as Indigenous from the reasons.) 
See also Law Society of Upper Canada v Harry, 2014 ONLSTH 173, [2014] LSDD No 223, relating to 
discipline of an Ontario paralegal, again in which Gladue was not considered.
43.  Law Society of Upper Canada v Levesque, 2005 CanLII 27007, [2005] LSDD No 38; Law Society of 
Upper Canada v Schuchert, [2001] LSDD No 63 (sub nom Schuchert, Re, 2001 CanLII 21499); Moore v 
Law Society of British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 1084 [Moore] (the underlying decision is unreported).
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B. Law Society Discipline: Purpose and Penalty
Law society legislation and codes of professional conduct across the country say little, 
if anything, about the purposes of lawyer discipline and the factors that determine penalties. 
The legislation does often indicate the purposes of the law society and self-regulation, which 
apply to discipline along with all other law society functions, among which most importantly 
“the Society has a duty to protect the public interest.” 44 Given this relative silence it is 
necessary to turn to disciplinary decisions themselves and case law related to them as relevant 
primary sources. In a passage that has been quoted with approval in lawyer disciplinary 
decisions in the majority of Canadian jurisdictions, Gavin MacKenzie writes that “the purposes 
of law society discipline proceedings are not to punish offenders and exact retribution, 
but rather to protect the public, maintain high professional standards, and preserve public 
confidence in the legal profession.”45 MacKenzie also refers to “the protective and deterrent 
functions of the discipline process.”46 Many aggravating and mitigating factors have been held 
to apply to penalty determination. The most detailed list, although explicitly not exhaustive, 
has been adopted by the BC Court of Appeal:
a. the nature and gravity of the conduct proven;
b. the age and experience of the respondent;
c. the previous character of the respondent, including details of prior discipline;
d. the impact upon the victim;
e. the advantage gained, or to be gained, by the respondent;
f. the number of times the offending conduct occurred;
g. whether the respondent has acknowledged the misconduct and taken steps 
to disclose and redress the wrong and the presence or absence of other 
mitigating circumstances;
h. the possibility of remediating or rehabilitating the respondent;
i. the impact on the respondent of criminal or other sanctions or penalties;
j. the impact of the proposed penalty on the respondent;
k. the need for specific and general deterrence;
l. the need to ensure the public’s confidence in the integrity of the profession; and
m. the range of penalties imposed in similar cases.47
A similar list has been recognized by the Ontario Divisional Court, of which two factors are in 
substance absent from the BC list:
44.  Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, s 4.2, para 3.
45.  MacKenzie, supra note 13 at Ch 26, 26.1, p 26-1. See Guttman v Law Society of Manitoba, 2010 MBCA 
66 at para 75, 255 Man R (2d) 151; Howe v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, 2019 NSCA 81 at para 190 
[Howe]; Vlug (Re), 2018 LSBC 26 at para 164, [2018] LSDD No 190; Law Society of Upper Canada v 
Walton, 2015 ONLSTA 8 at para 29, [2015] LSDD No 41; Law Society of Alberta v Schwartzberg, 2017 
ABLS 23, [2017] LSDD No 306; Winegarden, supra note 42 at para 78; Hutton, Re, 2006 CanLII 38726 
(NL LS); McNiven (Re), 2016 CanLII 32391 at para 63 (NWT LS). See also Law Society of Upper Canada 
v Kazman, 2008 ONLSAP 7 at para 75: “Disciplinary orders are directed toward four main purposes: a) 
Specific deterrence; b) General deterrence; c) In appropriate cases, improved competence, rehabilitation and 
or restitution; and d) Most important of all, maintaining public confidence in the legal profession.”
46.  MacKenzie, supra note 13 at Ch 26, 26.1, p 26-1.
47.  Faminoff v The Law Society of British Columbia, 2017 BCCA 373 at para 36, 4 BCLR (6th) 324.
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g.  whether there are extenuating circumstances (medical, family-related or others) 
that might explain, in whole or in part, the misconduct;
h.  whether the misconduct is out-of-character or, conversely, likely to recur.48
Other than “extenuating circumstances,” there is no explicit reference to the background of 
the lawyer or, paraphrasing the words of the court in Gladue, the “factors which may have 
played a part in bringing the particular [lawyer] before the [panel].” This absence makes it 
unclear where “the unique systemic and background factors” of Indigenous lawyers would 
be considered. From these lists, Gladue principles appear primarily relevant to “the need 
for specific and general deterrence,” “extenuating circumstances,” possible remediation 
or rehabilitation, and “the need to ensure the public’s confidence in the integrity of the 
profession,” but, as I will explain below,49 may also be relevant to the lawyer’s character.
C. Gladue in Lawyer Discipline
The first disciplinary matter in which Gladue principles were applied was Law Society of 
Upper Canada v Terence John Robinson.50 The unusual facts in LSUC v Robinson were that 
the lawyer enlisted a client to violently attack a non-client. The lawyer, being harassed and 
eventually pursued by a non-client who accused the lawyer of an affair with his girlfriend, 
contacted a client for assistance in “teach[ing] him a lesson” to end the harassment.51 The client 
and a fourth man attacked and seriously wounded the non-client.52 The lawyer pled guilty 
to aggravated assault.53 The lawyer argued that his Indigenous background was a mitigating 
factor, following Gladue, and more specifically that his “life experiences as an Aboriginal 
caused him to be suspicious of police and he therefore felt he was unable to call the police 
for assistance.”54 The lawyer admitted the charge of conduct unbecoming and the hearing 
panel imposed a two-year suspension.55 The hearing panel equated the lawyer’s conduct to 
misappropriation of client funds: “A lawyer’s integrity is the foundation of his practice. The 
public must have confidence that when a lawyer is retained he will never steal the client’s trust 
funds nor will the lawyer solicit the client to commit a criminal act.”56
48.  D’Mello v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONSC 5841 at paras 84, 91, 340 OAC 160 (Div Ct).
49.  See below note 62 and accompanying text.
50.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42. LSUC v Robinson AP is particularly persuasive given its panel, 
including two future treasurers (Janet A Leiper and Malcolm M Mercer), a former attorney general 
(Marion Boyd), and a highly regarded criminal law specialist (Mark Sandler). (Gladue principles were 
invoked in the prior matter of Law Society of Upper Canada v Selwyn Milan McSween, 2012 ONLSAP 3, 
[2012] LSDD No 15, but to argue that the principles should be applied to black lawyers.)
51.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 6, quoting LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at paras 4–7.
52.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 6, quoting LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at paras 8–9.
53.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 1; LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at para 2.
54.  LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at para 2.
55.  Ibid at paras 17, 48.
56.  Ibid at para 44. See similarly LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 51: “To state the obvious, the act 
of enlisting a client to break the law, and to do so violently, is contrary to everything that our profession 
stands for.”
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While the hearing panel held that the lawyer’s Indigeneity was not a mitigating factor, 
citing “the lack of evidence…or ‘case-specific information,’”57 the appeal panel—holding 
that there was such evidence—substituted a lesser suspension of one year.58 The appeal panel 
recognized that the professional disciplinary context was different from criminal sentencing—
in particular, “that a licensee’s liberty is not at stake in disciplinary proceedings”—but also 
that the Gladue provision of the Criminal Code did not apply, that disciplinary penalties did 
“not addres[s] the crisis of over-incarceration of Aboriginal people,” and that the objective of 
discipline was to maintain public confidence in the profession.59 However, it held that Gladue 
principles applied to disciplinary proceedings, they just applied differently:60
Hearing panels are concerned with the seriousness of misconduct or conduct 
unbecoming and circumstances that offer aggravation or mitigation. They are 
concerned with the culpability or moral blameworthiness of the licensee, and 
any facts that bear on those issues. They are concerned about the character of 
the licensee who appears before them. And they are concerned about crafting 
dispositions that meet the required objectives while promoting access to justice 
for everyone, including of course, the Aboriginal community. The latter is 
especially true for the Aboriginal community and others whose access to justice 
has been deeply problematic.
None of the above concerns are incompatible with maintaining public 
confidence in the legal profession. Indeed, consideration of unique systemic and 
background factors, as they reflect upon the seriousness of a licensee’s conduct, 
and his or her culpability or moral blameworthiness, is necessary to enhance 
respect for, and confidence in our profession and the self-regulation of all 
of its members.61
The panel also linked the lawyer’s Indigeneity to good character, observing specifically that “the 
systemic racism and discrimination which the appellant overcame to become a lawyer speaks 
powerfully about his character.”62 The law society conceded that the panel should consider 
“background and systemic factors,” that the lawyer “need not prove a causal connection 
between being an Aboriginal person and the subject conduct as long as the background and 
systemic factors may have played a role in bringing the offender before the hearing panel,” and 
that panels “may take judicial notice of systemic racism and discrimination.”63
The hearing panel did recognize as a mitigating factor that the lawyer provided services to 
the underserved Indigenous community:
57.  LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at para 36, quoting from Ipeelee, supra note 14. See also para 
31: “There is absolutely no evidence that the Lawyer was adversely affected because of his mother and 
grandmother having been sent away to residential schools as children.”
58.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 4.
59.  Ibid at para 73.
60.  Ibid at para 74.
61.  Ibid at paras 72–73.
62.  Ibid at para 55.
63.  Ibid at para 75.
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It is evident…that the Lawyer worked diligently for his clients who were 
disadvantaged and that he is committed to serving the Aboriginal community. 
We know Aboriginal people are over-represented in our justice system. We also 
know Aboriginal people face challenges in retaining lawyers. Permitting the 
Lawyer to return to practising law may serve to increase access to justice for 
the Aboriginal community. The panel is of the opinion that an Aboriginal 
lawyer providing legal services to Aboriginal clients will be a benefit to the 
public and to the courts.64
The appeal panel agreed on this point, noting that this factor “has relevance to what penalty is 
required to maintain confidence in the legal profession.”65
This principle in itself—that a lawyer’s past and future service of an underserved 
community, usually a particular ethnic or linguistic community (and typically the lawyer is 
a member of the community), is a mitigating factor to penalty—is not necessarily unique to 
Indigenous lawyers. For example, it has recently been accepted by the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal as a principle applicable to discipline of “racialized lawyer[s]” generally.66 Moreover, 
it can be applied in the discipline of Indigenous lawyers in the absence of Gladue principles.67
64.  LSUC v Robinson HP, supra note 42 at paras 39–41.
65.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 56.
66.  Howe, supra note 45 at paras 179 (describing the principle: “when addressing the sanctioning of a 
racialized lawyer, it is appropriate to consider the community’s need to have access to lawyers from their 
community in the justice system”) and 186–187 (holding it properly applies in Nova Scotia).
67.  See, for example, Mirasty, supra note 42 at para 131, aff’d Mirasty Appeal, supra note 42 at para 29: 
“It is acknowledged that Mr. Mirasty is an aboriginal person, practices in Northern Alberta in the area 
of criminal law, and has a unique ability, because of his cultural heritage and his ability to speak Cree, 
to provide access to legal services to a geographic and cultural community which is in significant need 
of legal assistance and support.” See also Moore, supra note 43 at para 97, reviewing an admissions 
decision: “As Ms. Moore notes and I am sure the Law Society would agree, it is also in the public 
interest to have practising Indigenous lawyers who can provide culturally appropriate services to clients. 
Supporting Indigenous lawyers in the process of becoming admitted to the bar and remaining members 
of the bar, whether that is accomplished through future policies or other means, will foster the process of 
reconciliation that the Law Society has, on its own initiative, embarked upon.”
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However, this principle is sometimes contested.68 Consider, for example, the panel in The 
Law Society of Manitoba v Nadeau, holding that underserved groups deserve and require 
protection against lawyer misconduct just as the general public does:
Being of a particular ancestry, ethnicity, culture or background often creates 
a rapport with people having similar traditions or characteristics. We accept 
that many of Nadeau’s clients were attracted to him because of his Aboriginal 
background.…We know that the Society is concerned that Aboriginal people, 
especially those in northern and other remote areas of the Province, are 
underserved in having access to legal services. However, the Society and its 
discipline panels have the duty and legal obligation to protect all Manitobans, 
including those of Aboriginal ancestry, from exposure to dishonest or unethical 
acts by lawyers.69
Nonetheless, this aspect of LSUC v Robinson is binding on Ontario hearing panels.
LSUC v Robinson was followed by a subsequent hearing panel in Law Society of Upper 
Canada v Batstone.70 The Indigenous lawyer had practised while suspended, but instead of the 
presumptive penalty of suspension the panel ordered only a reprimand.71 The panel noted both 
that the lawyer “has overcome significant barriers to get where she is” and that she served an 
Indigenous clientele.72
While not citing LSUC v Robinson, the panel in Law Society of Alberta v Willier 
recognized that Gladue principles could apply to lawyer discipline, though it declined to apply 
them on the basis of insufficient evidence.73 What distinguishes Willier from LSUC v Robinson 
is that Gladue principles were recognized as potentially applying not only to the penalty but 
68.  See, for example, Law Society of Upper Canada v Landry, 2008 ONLSAP 15 at para 23, [2008] 
LSDD No 140:
The Appellant invited the Appeal Panel to give consideration to the specific nature of 
the practice (family law) and the clients (members of the Francophone community) in 
assessing the hardship and the balance of convenience. It is the view of the Panel that clients 
are naturally inconvenienced when lawyers are found to have engaged in professional 
misconduct and face suspensions and/or revocation of their licences. The need to regulate 
the profession in the public interest necessitates this inconvenience. This is addressed by 
ensuring orderly transitions or temporary strategies to minimize the impact on clients. It is 
not, however, to be considered as a factor meriting the reduction of a properly determined 
penalty.
  See also Law Society of Ontario v Nguyen, 2018 ONLSTH 157 at para 84, [2018] LSDD No 236: “The 
fact that the Lawyer is one of a very few fluent Vietnamese-speaking lawyers currently practising law in his 
community, and that his clients will be deprived of his services if his licence is revoked, cannot affect our 
decision in the case of a presumptive penalty of revocation.”
69.  Nadeau, supra note 42.
70.  Batstone, supra note 42 at paras 10–14.
71.  Ibid at paras 10–11.
72.  Ibid at para 13: “She serves a community that is in particular need of her services in a circumstance where 
there is a particular need for First Nations lawyers to serve them.”
73.  Willier, supra note 42 at paras 31 and 35: “we have not been provided with any evidence respecting Mr. 
Willier’s personal or family circumstances that would explain, mitigate, or otherwise affect Mr. Willier’s 
responsibility for the costs of these proceedings.”
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also to costs.74 Like in LSUC v Robinson and Batstone, the lawyer’s service to Indigenous 
clients, “a traditionally underserviced area of the public,” was cited as a mitigating factor.75
Although not a discipline decision, Gladue principles were also argued on the judicial 
review of the admissions decisions of the Credentials Committee in Moore v Law Society of 
British Columbia.76 However, Watchuk J held that the failure to consider Gladue principles did 
not compromise the reasonableness of the challenged decisions—although noting that the Law 
Society could have been more responsive to the applicant.77 Moreover, the reasons in Moore do 
not indicate how Gladue factors might have affected the analysis.
In order to determine whether LSUC v Robinson and Batstone were correctly decided—
that is, whether Gladue principles are applicable in lawyer discipline proceedings—it 
is necessary to examine the appellate case law to identify and establish the criteria for 
the extension of Gladue principles beyond criminal sentencing. It is to this case law 
that I turn now.
II FOUR APPROACHES TO THE EXTENSION OF GLADUE 
PRINCIPLES BEYOND CRIMINAL SENTENCING
As Judge Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond noted extra-judicially in 2000, “the reasoning in 
the Gladue decision is not of the sort that is narrowly confined to one specific component 
of the administration of justice.”78 But despite the spread of Gladue principles, there are no 
settled legal criteria or legal tests for when Gladue principles should be extended beyond the 
context of criminal sentencing. Likewise, while there is some literature on the application of 
Gladue principles to individual contexts outside criminal sentencing, there appears to be little 
consideration of, and no clear test proposed for, when those extensions beyond sentencing 
are appropriate.79 Jonathan Rudin’s observation in 2008 remains applicable today: “One of 
the live questions arising from the [Gladue] decision was the extent to which the decision 
74.  Ibid at para 35.
75.  Ibid at para 15.
76.  Moore, supra note 43.
77.  Ibid at para 96.
78.  Judge ME Turpel-Lafond, “Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural Implications of R. 
v. Gladue” (2000) 43 Crim LQ 34:1 at 47–48.
79.  See, for example, Jillian Rogin, “Gladue and Bail: The Pre-Trial Sentencing of Aboriginal People in 
Canada” (2017) 95:2 Can Bar Rev 325; Jonathan Rudin, “The Application of Gladue Principles to 
Ontario Review Board Hearings in Theory and Practice” (2012) 33:3 For the Defence 31; Shaunna Kelly, 
“Application of Gladue Principles Beyond Sentencing Hearings” (2012) 33:3 For the Defence 34 [on bail 
only]; Erin Dann, “United States of America v Leonard: Why Gladue Principles Matter in Extradition” 
(2013) 34:3 For the Defence F3. See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Arash Nayerahmadi, “Over-Indebted 
Criminals in Canada” (2019) 42:4 Manitoba LJ 207, arguing that Gladue principles should apply to victim 
surcharges (at 231-232) and fines (at 233); R v Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58 at paras 83, 94. But see Kent 
Roach, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts of Appeal” (2009) 54 Crim 
LQ 470 at 499–503. Roach describes several extensions of Gladue but does not take the next step in his 
analysis as I do here.
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could be extended to other areas involving the treatment of Aboriginal offenders by the 
justice system.”80
Thus, to determine whether Gladue principles properly apply to lawyer discipline, I must 
first establish a legal test for the extension of Gladue principles to new contexts. In this part, 
I trace the extension of Gladue principles beyond criminal sentencing by appellate courts to 
identify approaches to the extension of Gladue principles. These approaches are candidate 
tests, or candidate components of a test, for such extension.
I argue that the case law demonstrates four approaches to when Gladue principles will 
apply. The first is an overlapping considerations approach, where the applicable legal test 
includes considerations, purposes, or factors that overlap with criminal law sentencing. The 
second is an alienation contextual approach, where the alienation of Canada’s Indigenous 
peoples from the justice system, and particularly the criminal justice system, is relevant to the 
proceeding or the legal test to be applied.81 The third is a liberty interest approach, where the 
liberty interest of an Indigenous person is at stake in the proceedings. These three approaches 
are expressly evident in the case law I will discuss below, with different ones predominating 
in different cases. That is, these first three approaches are ones that the judges appear to 
be expressly applying (without stating these are the only or complete approaches, or even 
identifying or articulating them as approaches). They apply to categories of cases involving 
Indigenous persons, such as all extradition decisions or all bail decisions.
The fourth approach is a criminal conduct approach, where the conduct at issue constitutes 
or nears criminal conduct. While this approach is not invoked in the case law, I identify it from 
the cases. That is, this fourth approach is a set of commonalities I have identified from these 
cases that the court does not seem to explicitly recognize. Outside of proceedings under the 
Criminal Code, this fourth approach applies not to entire categories of cases, but on a case-by-
case basis depending on the particular facts.
As I will demonstrate from the appellate decisions, these four approaches are partially 
overlapping and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Prior to LSUC v Robinson, Gladue principles had been applied by appellate courts in 
review board dispositions of accused found to be not criminally responsible (NCR),82 civil 
contempt,83 bail,84 and extradition.85 In this part I examine these decisions to establish my four 
80.  Jonathan Rudin, “Aboriginal Over-representation and R v Gladue: Where We Were, Where We Are and 
Where We Might Be Going” (2008) 40 SCLR (2d) 687 at 699.
81.  I acknowledge that following Gladue, addressing this alienation is a purpose of criminal sentencing. I 
separate it out for my analysis.
82.  R v Sim (2005), 78 OR (3d) 183, 201 CCC (3d) 482 (CA), Sharpe JA [Sim]. Sim is discussed in Roach, 
supra note 79 at 502–503.
83.  Frontenac Ventures Co v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation, 2008 ONCA 534, 91 OR (3d) 1 [Frontenac 
Ventures]. Frontenac Ventures is discussed in Roach, supra note 79 at 500–501.
84.  R v Robinson, 2009 ONCA 205, 95 OR (3d) 309 [R v Robinson]. (R v Robinson was recently codified in 
Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 493.2: An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act 
and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 25, s 210.)
85.  United States v Leonard, 2012 ONCA 622, 112 OR (3d) 496, [2012] 4 CNLR 305, Sharpe JA (Doherty JA 
dissenting on remedy only) [Leonard].
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approaches.86 I then consider the impact of two decisions following LSUC v Robinson in which 
the Supreme Court of Canada has declined to apply Gladue principles to jury roll composition 
and to prosecutorial discretion.87
A. R v Sim: Review Board NCR Decisions
The first major extension of Gladue principles beyond criminal law sentencing by an 
appellate court was R v Sim, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal extended Gladue principles 
to review board dispositions of accused found to be NCR. Justice Sharpe, writing for the court, 
considered the statutory criteria for the disposition and concluded that Indigeneity was relevant 
to these criteria: “proper consideration of appropriate placement of the accused, reintegration 
into society and the other needs of the accused will call, where the circumstances warrant, 
for the [review board] to advert to the unique circumstances and background of aboriginal 
NCR accused.”88 In doing so, Sharpe JA emphasized the alienation aspects of Gladue.89 He 
noted that the Supreme Court of Canada in Gladue “suggested that the principles motivating 
its decision could have wider ramifications,”90 quoting the Supreme Court’s observation that 
alienation from the criminal justice system went beyond sentencing: “It is clear that sentencing 
innovation by itself cannot remove the causes of aboriginal offending and the greater problem 
of aboriginal alienation from the criminal justice system…There are many aspects of this sad 
situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons.”91 Thus, Sharpe JA concluded that “I do 
not think that the principles underlying Gladue should be limited to the sentencing process 
and I can see no reason to disregard the Gladue principles when assessing the criminal justice 
system’s treatment of NCR accused.”92
The reasons of Sharpe JA in Sim explicitly demonstrate the alienation contextual approach. 
The liberty interest and criminal conduct approaches, implicit in his reasoning, apply because 
the liberty interest of an Indigenous person is engaged and the conduct at issue is criminal 
conduct, albeit primarily future criminal conduct. The overlapping purposes approach applies, 
86.  I do not consider appellate decisions regarding other aspects of sentencing: parole ineligibility (R v Jensen 
(2005), 74 OR (3d) 561, 195 CCC (3d) 14 (CA)), dangerous offender and long-term offender designations 
(R v Ladue, 2011 BCCA 101, 271 CCC (3d) 90, [2011] 2 CNLR 277), or the correct court in which to try 
a young person (R v MN, 2004 NUCA 2, 354 AR 243). (Jensen and MN are discussed in Roach, supra note 
79 at 500–501.) Neither do I consider trial-level judicial reviews of administrative decision makers: see, for 
example, parole hearings (Twins v Canada (AG), 2016 FC 537, [2016] 3 CNLR 342 [Twins]) and prisoner 
segregation decisions (Hamm v Canada (AG), 2016 ABQB 440, 41 Alta LR (6th) 29). (Thanks to Benjamin 
Ralston for bringing Twins and Hamm to my attention.) See also David Milward & Debra Parkes, 
“Gladue: Beyond Myth and Towards Implementation in Manitoba” (2011) 35:1 Man LJ 84 at 107, n 117: 
“the Correctional Service of Canada [in 2008] has directed that all CSC staff should consider all decisions 
affecting Aboriginal persons in custody in accordance with ‘Gladue principles’” [citation omitted].
87.  Kokopenace SCC, supra note 14; R v Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 SCR 167 [Anderson].
88.  Sim, supra note 82 at para 19.
89.  Ibid at paras 16–19
90.  Ibid at para 15.
91.  Gladue, supra note 1 at para 65, quoted in Sim, supra note 82 at para 15.
92.  Sim, supra note 82 at para 16.
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although not evident from the reasoning, insofar as factors relevant to criminal sentencing (in 
particular public safety) are relevant to the legal test being applied.93
B. Frontenac Ventures Co v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation:  
Civil Contempt
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Frontenac Ventures Co v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation 
extended Gladue principles to sentencing for civil contempt. Justice MacPherson for the court 
noted that the broader themes of Gladue, particularly alienation from the justice system, were 
especially relevant in the context of this civil contempt for a blockade of lawful drilling:
Although Gladue was focused primarily on the serious problem of excessive 
imprisonment of aboriginal peoples, the case in a broader sense draws 
attention to the state of the justice system’s engagement with Canada’s First 
Nations. I note three factors in particular that were highlighted in Gladue: 
the estrangement of aboriginal peoples from the Canadian justice system, the 
impact of years of dislocation and whether imprisonment would be meaningful 
to the community of which the offender is a member. Those factors were all at 
stake in this case.94
Justice MacPherson recognized the distinct purposes of civil and criminal contempt, specifically 
that “the purpose of a sentence for criminal contempt is punishment, whereas the purpose of a 
sentence for civil contempt is coercive or persuasive, designed to enforce the rights of a private 
party.”95 However, this distinction had little impact because “the nature of the appellants’ 
conduct in repeatedly disobeying the interim and interlocutory injunctions came extremely 
close to criminal contempt.”96
Thus, Frontenac Ventures most explicitly demonstrates the alienation contextual 
approach, but also qualifies for the liberty interest approach. In contrast, the overlapping 
considerations approach is downplayed by the distinction between the purposes of civil and 
criminal contempt.
Frontenac Ventures also demonstrates the criminal conduct approach in its emphasis on 
the fact that the conduct at issue was very close to criminal contempt. Under this approach, 
Frontenac Ventures does not necessarily hold that Gladue principles apply to every sentencing 
of an Indigenous person for civil contempt—they might apply only where the particular civil 
contempt is close to criminal contempt.
C. R v Robinson: Bail
93.  Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 672.54: “When a court or Review Board makes a disposition…it shall, 
taking into account the safety of the public, which is the paramount consideration, the mental condition of 
the accused, the reintegration of the accused into society and the other needs of the accused, make one of 
the following dispositions that is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances.”
94.  Frontenac Ventures, supra note 83 at para 57.
95.  Ibid at para 37 [citation omitted].
96.  Ibid at para 37.
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Bail is arguably the easiest extension of Gladue principles, given that the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Gladue explicitly identified bail as a reason for overincarceration of Indigenous 
persons: “The unbalanced ratio of imprisonment for aboriginal offenders flows from a number 
of sources.…It arises also from bias against aboriginal people and from an unfortunate 
institutional approach that is more inclined to refuse bail and to impose more and longer 
prison terms for aboriginal offenders.”97 In R v Robinson, Winkler CJO explicitly approved 
the extension of Gladue principles to bail.98 His reasoning is relatively conclusory and does not 
reveal which of my approaches he applied: “It is common ground that principles enunciated in 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Gladue…have application to the question 
of bail.”99 While other appellate courts have followed R v Robinson implicitly or explicitly, 
they have not provided an analysis explaining why it was correctly decided.100
However, the context of bail demonstrates all four approaches that I have identified. Two 
of these approaches obviously apply: the liberty interest approach, as the liberty interest of an 
Indigenous person is engaged, and the criminal conduct approach, as the conduct at issue is, 
by definition, criminal. The alienation contextual approach seems as applicable as in criminal 
sentencing,101 although Winkler CJO did not explicitly invoke alienation or estrangement. 
As for the overlapping considerations approach, the three grounds for refusing bail in the 
Criminal Code overlap with the factors in criminal sentencing, particularly public safety under 
the secondary ground.102
97.  Gladue, supra note 1 at para 65 [emphasis added]. See also Rogin, supra note 79 at 354: “Gladue mandates 
a return to first principles of the law of bail in recognition of the crisis facing the bail system in Canada and 
the ways it might impact Aboriginal people.”
98.  R v Robinson, supra note 84, Winkler CJO. See also Rogin, supra note 79 at 333 (criticizing the reasoning 
in R v Robinson at 332 and 334) and 332: “Courts have found that the above [Gladue] principles are 
applicable to bail hearings in a number of disparate and contradictory ways, presenting a piecemeal 
approach to the application of Gladue to bail that lacks cohesion.” But see also Rogin at 336: “The 
fact that R v Gladue and Ipeelee have been found to apply outside of sentencing should not mean that 
sentencing principles are to be applied inappropriately without regard to the different legal contexts.”
99.  R v Robinson, supra note 84 at para 13. For stronger language criticizing the reasons in R v Robinson, 
see R v Heathen, 2018 SKPC 29 at para 12: “there is literally no analysis at all. There is simply the bald 
statement that Gladue applies.”
100.  R v Oakes, 2015 ABCA 178 at para 11 explicitly follows R v Robinson, as does R v Hope, 2016 ONCA 
648 at paras 8–12, 133 OR (3d) 154 (see Rogin, supra note 79 at 333) and R v Louie, 2019 BCCA 257 at 
para 35. R v Whitebear, 2018 ABCA 300 at para 7, while not mentioning R v Robinson, does accept that 
Gladue principles apply to bail but without providing an analysis.
101.  See, for example, Rich v Her Majesty the Queen, 2009 NLTD 69 at para 18, 286 Nfld & PEIR 346 [Rich]: 
“Gladue focused on sentencing principles, but it talked about other issues that are relevant to bail: the 
estrangement of aboriginal peoples from the Canadian justice system, the impact of years of dislocation, 
whether imprisonment would be meaningful to the community of which the offender is a member, over-
representation of members of the aboriginal community in prisons, overuse of incarceration and other 
concerns unique to aboriginal communities. These types [of] factors are all relevant to bail hearings.” See 
also R v Magill, 2013 YKTC 8 at para 46, [2013] YJ No 127 (QL): “In terms of how Gladue should inform 
a bail court’s consideration of the tertiary ground, I think that the hypothetical reasonable person whose 
views we are considering is also one that is apprised of the backdrop against which Aboriginal people come 
to appear before criminal courts. This means an awareness of the history of colonialism, dislocation and 
residential schools that Gladue and Ipeelee describe. This also means a recognition of the responsibility 
that the Canadian government must assume in addressing the harm that has been occasioned.”
102.  Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 515(10)(b): “where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of 
the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years.”
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D. United States v Leonard: Extradition
In United States v Leonard, the Ontario Court of Appeal extended Gladue principles to 
the extradition context. Justice Sharpe for the court noted that Gladue principles were relevant 
to one criterion in the legal test for extradition, “the severity of the sentence the accused is 
likely to receive in each jurisdiction.”103 This demonstrates the overlapping considerations 
approach—the result of the criteria for criminal sentencing is itself a consideration. The 
criminal conduct approach also clearly applies, as the conduct for which extradition is sought 
is also, by definition, criminal. Justice Sharpe also quoted with approval the alienation language 
from Gladue.104 However, Sharpe JA emphasized what I have described as the liberty interest 
approach, holding that Gladue applied whenever a liberty interest was engaged in criminal or 
“related proceedings”:
The jurisprudence that I have already reviewed indicates that the Gladue 
factors are not limited to criminal sentencing but that they should be 
considered by all “decision-makers who have the power to influence the 
treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice system” (Gladue, at para 
65) whenever an Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and 
related proceedings.105
Indeed, the panel in LSUC v Robinson acknowledged that the engagement of a liberty interest 
is one unifying factor of previous extensions of Gladue principles.106 Leonard leaves open, 
however, the scope of “related proceedings” and whether engagement of the liberty interest is 
necessary, not just sufficient, for the application of Gladue principles.
This liberty interest approach is also supported by the work of L Jane McMillan, who 
suggests that “Gladue principles should be applied to all areas of the criminal justice system in 
which an Aboriginal offender’s liberty is at stake.”107 Similarly, Kelsey L. Sitar states that “the 
Gladue principles are relevant and worthy of consideration any time an Aboriginal offender 
risks losing his or her liberty and/or comes into contact with the justice system.”108 (Sitar’s 
103.  Leonard, supra note 85 at para 84, quoting from United States of America v Cotroni; United States of 
America v El Zein, [1989] 1 SCR 1469 at 1498–1499, 48 CCC (3d) 193.
104.  Leonard, supra note 85 at para 51, quoting Gladue, supra note 1 at para 88.
105.  Leonard, supra note 85 at para 85, quoted in LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 71 
[emphasis added].
106.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 71. See also Dann, supra note 79: “[Leonard] confirms that 
the application of Gladue principles extends beyond sentencing and should be considered whenever an 
Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and related proceedings.” See also Manikis, supra note 
17 at 183, defining Gladue as “the principle that requires public agencies to take into account the status of 
Aboriginal people and their backgrounds when making decisions that can affect their liberty interests.” See, 
for example, Roach, supra note 79 at 474: “The Ontario Court of Appeal has emerged as the leader among 
courts of appeal in extending the reach of Gladue and in being sensitive to the need to apply its principles 
to all detention decisions regarding Aboriginal offenders” [emphasis added].
107.  See, for example L Jane McMillan, “Living Legal Traditions: Mi’kmaw Justice in Nova Scotia” (2016) 67 
UNB LJ 187 at 201, n 38. This approach is also demonstrated in Marie Manikis’s argument that Gladue 
principles are a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter: Manikis, supra note 17.
108.  Kelsey L Sitar, “Gladue as a Sword: Incorporating Critical Race Perspectives into the Canadian Criminal 
Trial” (2016) 20 Can Crim L Rev 247 at 253, citing LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42, as well as three 
of the appellate decisions I have discussed here.
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addition of “comes into contact with the justice system” arguably transcends the engagement 
of the liberty interest.)
Subsequent to LSUC v Robinson, LaForme JA in Kokopenace explained Leonard, 
alongside Sim and Frontenac Ventures, by applying what I have described as an alienation 
contextual approach:
In recent years, this court has come to the recognition that the Gladue 
principles properly extend beyond sentencing for criminal offences, and that 
Gladue’s underlying philosophy bears on other aspects of the interaction 
between Aboriginal peoples and the justice system.…This extension was 
implicit in the recognition in Gladue, at para 65, and Ipeelee, at para 61, 
that sentencing innovation alone would not solve the greater alienation of 
aboriginal people from the criminal justice system.109
This emphasis of the alienation contextual approach is, of course, not necessarily contradictory 
to the liberty interest approach. It merely reflects a difference in emphasis.
Thus, of these four approaches, the most recently and explicitly emphasized are the 
liberty interest approach in Leonard and the alienation contextual approach in the reasons of 
LaForme JA in Kokopenace.
E. R v Kokopenace and R v Anderson: Has the Supreme Court of 
Canada Restricted these Approaches?
A test for the extension of Gladue principles to contexts beyond criminal sentencing must 
also account for the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Kokopenace and R v 
Anderson. As Alexandra Hebert has noted, “the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply 
Gladue principles beyond the sentencing stage.”110
The decision in R v Kokopenace appears to qualify or pull back both from the proposition 
that Gladue principles apply wherever Indigenous alienation from the justice system is relevant 
and from the proposition that they apply wherever the liberty interest of an Indigenous person 
is engaged. The Supreme Court in Kokopenace reversed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s holding 
that the process by which jury rolls were generated inexcusably minimized the opportunities 
for Indigenous people to serve as jurors, constituting a violation of the accused’s rights 
under sections 11(d) and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.111 While 
all three judges on the Court of Appeal panel wrote separate reasons, even the dissenting 
109.  Kokopenace CA, supra note 14 at paras 142–143. See also Twins, supra note 86 at para 57: “The common 
thread underlying all these decisions [Gladue, supra note 1, Ipeelee, supra note 14, Sim, supra note 82, and 
Rich, supra note 101] is a recognition of the systemic and background factors that have contributed to the 
over-incarceration of Aboriginal peoples in Canada and to what has been described as the estrangement of 
Aboriginal peoples from the Canadian justice system.”
110.  Alexandra Hebert, “Change in Paradigm or Change in Paradox? Gladue Report Practices and Access to 
Justice” (2017) 43:1 Queen’s LJ 149 at 173.
111.  The Crown did not attempt to establish justification of the infringement under section 1 of the Charter: 
Kokopenace CA, supra note 14 at para 18.
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judge held that sections 11(d) and 11(f) were engaged, merely disagreeing that they were 
violated on the facts.112
At the Court of Appeal, LaForme JA had emphasized the failure of Gladue, and Gladue 
principles, in solving Indigenous overincarceration and alienation from the criminal justice 
system.113 (While Goudge JA provided concurring reasons, these reasons neither adopted nor 
rejected the observations by LaForme JA on Indigenous alienation from the justice system.114) 
Implicit in this emphasis was the imperative for courts to use all available tools to remedy 
that alienation.
Nonetheless, faced with this cri-de-coeur from the country’s most senior Indigenous 
judge, the majority at the Supreme Court of Canada adopted, with only conclusory reasoning, 
a minimalist and fixed interpretation of the rights at issue. Justice Moldaver, writing for the 
majority, held that “the right to a representative jury is an entitlement held by the accused that 
promotes the fairness of his or her trial, in appearance and in reality. It is not a mechanism for 
repairing the damaged relationship between particular societal groups and our criminal justice 
system more generally—and it should not be tasked with that responsibility.”115 Indeed, the 
majority specifically asserted, virtually without explanation, that “the honour of the Crown 
and Gladue principles should not have been considered because neither is relevant to the state’s 
obligation to make reasonable efforts to compile the jury roll using random selection from 
lists that draw from a broad cross-section of society and deliver jury notices to those who have 
been randomly selected.”116 Thus, the majority asserted that “by relying on the honour of the 
Crown and Gladue principles, the majority transformed the accused’s s 11 Charter rights into a 
vehicle for repairing the long-standing rupture between Aboriginal groups and Canada’s justice 
system”—without explaining why section 11 is not and should not be transformed into such 
a vehicle.117 Similarly, Karakatsanis J’s concurring reasons stated that section 11 was not the 
“correct constitutional tool.…It is beyond the scope of an accused’s fair trial rights as protected 
by s 11(d) and (f) of the Charter to require the state to address issues that may cause segments 
of the population to disengage from the justice system.…Other tools must be brought to bear 
to resolve these problems.”118
To his credit, Cromwell J, writing in dissent for himself and McLachlin CJ, observed 
that “while there are many deeply seated causes which contribute to Aboriginal under-
representation on jury rolls, the Charter in my view ought to be read as providing an impetus 
for change, not an excuse for saying that the remedy lies elsewhere.”119 More importantly, 
he explicitly held that the majority’s approach was contrary to Gladue, although framing the 
issue as discrimination as opposed to alienation more broadly: “To ignore racial discrimination 
against Aboriginal people in the context of assembling a jury roll would be in marked contrast 
112.  Ibid at para 334, Rouleau JA.
113.  Ibid at paras 135–144.
114.  Ibid at paras 233–277.
115.  Kokopenace SCC, supra note 14 at para 1, Moldaver J for the majority.
116.  Ibid at para 98, Moldaver J for the majority. The honour of the Crown is an important legal concept but is 
beyond the scope of this article.
117.  Ibid 14 at para 101, Moldaver J for the majority
118.  Ibid at paras 171, 172, 188, Karakatsanis J, concurring.
119.  Ibid at para 196, Cromwell J, dissenting.
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to the approach that this Court has taken to racial discrimination against Aboriginal people 
in relation to sentencing Aboriginal offenders.”120 (Indeed, Tim Quigley has noted that “the 
disproportional incarceration rate of Aboriginal people dealt with in Gladue and Ipeelee is at 
least as, if not more, intractable than the unrepresentativeness of the jury roll in this case.”121)
This minimalist and fixed interpretation of rights by Moldaver J has rightfully attracted 
criticism elsewhere. As Quigley has argued, the majority ignored the social and legal context 
and the government’s role in its creation and perpetuation:
The majority position is a weak and timid response to serious constitutional 
claims.…the majority in Kokopenace adamantly refused to consider the 
sad legacy of colonialism and estrangement that the Aboriginal population 
of Canada has suffered and how this might have had a bearing on the 
disillusionment with and disengagement from the criminal justice system 
by this segment of our population. Instead, Moldaver J has absolved 
the state for any responsibility for this state of affairs. In the majority 
view, the unwillingness of Aboriginal on-reserve residents to respond 
to jury questionnaires and become available for jury duty is their 
responsibility alone.122
Similarly, Julian Falconer states that “the more troubling message sent by the majority 
opinion is that the alienation of First Nations peoples from the justice system is not actually a 
legal problem.”123
In contrast, the dissent has garnered praise. Quigley concludes that “it is commendable, 
therefore, that at least the dissenting justices drew a comparison with their own jurisprudence 
in R v Gladue and R v Ipeelee and conducted a lengthy analysis of the role of the state in the 
underrepresentation of Aboriginal residents in this case.”124 Similarly, Falconer writes that “the 
dissent recognized that failure to consider the state’s historical relationship with Aboriginal 
peoples, including the distressing social issues that many First Nations communities now face 
as a result, detracts significantly from any analysis of Aboriginal rights in the justice system.”125
Kokopenace is jarringly inconsistent with previous jurisprudence from the Supreme Court 
of Canada. As Falconer puts it, “we can only hope that the Kokopenace judgment becomes 
an anomaly in the context of a Court which, in recent years, has a well-earned reputation for 
120.  Ibid at para 284, Cromwell J, dissenting.
121.  Tim Quigley, “Kokopenace: Charter Rights to Jury Representation for Aboriginal Accused Are Obliterated 
for Expediency” (2015) 20 CR (7th) 99 at 103.
122.  Quigley, ibid at 99, 103 [emphasis in original].
123.  Julian N Falconer, “The Kokopenace Judgment: A Case of Mistaken Identity” (2015) 36:2 For The Defence 
F3 [emphasis in original].
124.  Quigley, supra note 121 at 103 [citations omitted]. See also Rosemary Cairns Way, “An Opportunity for 
Equality: Kokopenace and Nur at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 61:4 CLQ 465, writing before 
the Supreme Court of Canada decision (though specifically addressing the section 15 claim): “It would be 
ironic…if the Court, having repeatedly named the discrimination experienced by Aboriginal peoples in 
the criminal justice system, is unprepared to at least countenance a claim that a particular state process is 
discriminatory and thus equality-denying.”
125.  Falconer, supra note 123.
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adjudicating Aboriginal rights claims in a sensitive and respectful fashion.”126 Kokopenace 
is especially jarring in its rejection of Gladue principles, particularly because three of the 
four approaches I have identified would seem to apply. While the overlapping considerations 
approach would not seem to apply, the liberty interest and criminal conduct approaches 
apply, as the defendant’s liberty interest is engaged by the composition of the jury roll and 
the conduct at issue is criminal. More fundamentally, the alienation contextual approach is 
dominant: Indigenous underrepresentation on jury rolls constitutes both a symptom and an 
exacerbation of Indigenous alienation from the Canadian justice system. The holding that 
section 11 of the Charter cannot address alienation, and thus Gladue principles cannot apply, 
seems to be entirely sui generis and reveals no connection to existing case law on the extension 
of Gladue. The most that can be drawn from Kokopenace is that Gladue principles do not 
apply to jury roll composition, albeit for poorly articulated and essentially assumed reasons 
about the nature of section 11 of the Charter.
Following Kokopenace, the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Anderson declined to apply 
Gladue principles to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Justice Moldaver for the court 
held that Gladue principles do not apply to a Crown prosecutor’s decision to tender a notice 
in impaired driving cases, which notice serves to increase the mandatory minimum sentence, 
and that that decision falls within prosecutorial discretion.127 In doing so, Moldaver J held 
that Gladue principles apply to the judge but not to the prosecutor.128 (Justice Moldaver 
clarified that, while the minister’s surrender decision in Leonard would appear to constitute 
prosecutorial discretion, Gladue principles applied in Leonard only because the surrender 
decision “requires the Minister of Justice to compare the likely sentence that would be imposed 
in a foreign state with the likely sentence that would be imposed in Canada—a task which is 
impossible to do without reference to the Gladue principles.”129)
Anderson is perhaps more understandable—or at least predictable—than Kokopenace 
given how strictly Canadian courts protect prosecutorial discretion. As Marie Manikis has 
noted, “the conclusion in Anderson is not surprising given the larger Canadian trend towards 
protecting prosecutorial power and decision-making from judicial oversight.”130 Anderson 
is nonetheless unfortunate. Prosecutorial decision making obviously plays a major role in 
Indigenous overincarceration, and to rule that whole realm of decisions off limits (absent abuse 
of process) is to limit, as in Kokopenace, the tools by which Indigenous alienation from the 
justice system can be addressed.131 Given that all four of my approaches apply to Anderson, 
Anderson is perhaps best understood as stating that Gladue principles will not apply to 
prosecutorial discretion.132
126.  Ibid.
127.  Anderson, supra note 87 at paras 1–5.
128.  Ibid at para 25.
129.  Ibid at para 27 [emphasis in original].
130.  Manikis, supra note 17 at 186.
131.  See, for example, Manikis, ibid at 174–175, 193.
132.  In the alternative, Anderson could also be read as stating that Gladue principles apply only to judicial 
decision making—but that would extend beyond the ratio itself in Anderson.
43
(2020) 4:1 Lakehead Law Journal  Martin
It remains unclear how these interpretations in Kokopenace and Anderson will impact the 
extension of Gladue principles going forward.133 While all of my four approaches applied to 
Anderson and three to Kokopenace, the court in those cases rejected the extension of Gladue 
principles. Thus, these four approaches cannot be universally sufficient even in combination 
for the extension of Gladue principles—and, if they are potentially sufficient in combination, 
there will be as-yet-unarticulated exceptions, like prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has stunted and implicitly questioned this line of cases without providing 
guidance to appellate and trial courts.
III A LEGAL TEST FOR THE EXTENSION OF GLADUE 
PRINCIPLES BEYOND CRIMINAL SENTENCING
In this section I consider whether these four approaches, alone or in combination, 
constitute a test for the extension of Gladue principles. I then apply them to the context of 
lawyer discipline.
As I noted above, the appellate case law demonstrates that these four approaches may be 
overlapping and not mutually exclusive, but the Supreme Court of Canada decisions mean 
that they are not sufficient in combination. The analytical question remains: Should each 
of the four approaches be necessary or sufficient for Gladue principles to apply? Does one 
predominate? Most important to evaluating whether LSUC v Robinson was and remains 
correctly decided is whether the liberty interest approach is overriding, such that an Indigenous 
person’s liberty interest must be engaged for Gladue principles to apply. Furthermore, the 
criminal conduct approach suggests that the scope of LSUC v Robinson may be narrow, 
applying only to criminal conduct or near-criminal conduct. I also consider, following the 
possibility acknowledged in Willier, whether Gladue principles apply to costs awards in 
disciplinary proceedings.
As I have described, one approach to the application of Gladue principles is the liberty 
interest approach, which holds that Gladue principles apply where an Indigenous person’s 
liberty interest is engaged. This approach is clearest in the reasoning of Sharpe JA in Leonard: 
“Gladue factors are not limited to criminal sentencing…they should be considered…whenever 
an Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and related proceedings.”134 This language 
raises the question of whether a liberty interest is necessary for Gladue principles to apply—
that is, whether Gladue principles apply if and only if a liberty interest is engaged. Similarly, 
Manikis’s argument that Gladue principles are a principle of fundamental justice135 prompts 
133.  I note, however, that the Yukon Court of Appeal has explicitly relied on Anderson, supra note 87, and 
its restrictive interpretation of Leonard, supra note 85, to decline to require judges to consider Gladue 
factors in the calculation of enhanced credit under s 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, supra note 8, and in 
rejecting the sentencing judge’s conclusion that “penal legislation that disallows any consideration of an 
individual’s Aboriginal status is constitutionally flawed, offends the principles of fundamental justice and 
can only be considered to have a grossly disproportionate impact on Aboriginal offenders”: R v Chambers, 
2014 YKCA 13 at paras 81–87, 89 [quotation is from 89], 316 CCC (3d) 44. (This is despite the fact that 
Anderson distinguished the role of the prosecutor from the role of the judge.)
134.  Leonard, supra note 85 at para 85.
135.  Manikis, supra note 17.
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the question of whether they are, for the purposes of constitutional law, only a principle of 
fundamental justice.
The liberty interest approach is appealing but inherently flawed as a test for the extension 
of Gladue principles. Admittedly, the liberty interest approach neatly collects and simply 
explains the leading appellate decisions, other than Kokopenace and Anderson. It is explicit in 
the language of Sharpe JA and in some of the literature,136 and it is explicitly acknowledged 
in LSUC v Robinson.137 Kokopenace and Anderson can perhaps be distinguished as outliers 
or exceptional cases on the particular strength of prosecutorial discretion and the particular 
(and peculiar) narrowness of jury composition rights under the Charter. Moreover, the liberty 
interest approach is simple and clear in its application. However, there is nothing in the 
reasoning of Sharpe JA in Leonard to suggest that Gladue principles cannot apply where the 
liberty interest is not engaged, or that that was his intention. Indeed, if he had purported to 
decide that Gladue principles apply only where the liberty interest is engaged, that holding 
would have been obiter, as that question was not at issue on the facts of the case.138 That is, 
while the liberty interest is descriptive of the past appellate case law on Gladue, it should not 
be considered proscriptive of future extensions of Gladue.
Moreover, to recognize the liberty interest as controlling unduly narrows the scope 
and potential of Gladue. The Supreme Court of Canada in Gladue was concerned about 
Indigenous overincarceration not only in itself but also as a symptom of the broader alienation 
of Indigenous persons from the justice system: “The excessive imprisonment of aboriginal 
people is only the tip of the iceberg insofar as the estrangement of the aboriginal peoples 
from the Canadian criminal justice system is concerned.”139 Thus, the alienation contextual 
approach is the most purposive. Moreover, it is the one most evident in the appellate case 
law discussed above, especially in the reasoning of LaForme JA in Kokopenace grouping Sim, 
Frontenac Ventures, and Leonard. It is in this respect that the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Kokopenace is most jarring and, indeed, inconsistent with a purposive reading of 
Gladue that recognizes that all possible tools must be used to address all aspects of this crisis. 
An alienation contextual approach to the extension of Gladue principles to lawyer discipline 
in LSUC v Robinson reflects the fact that Indigenous lawyers are both Indigenous people 
who are alienated from the justice system and the people whose work mitigates the alienation 
of Indigenous peoples more generally. Under this alienation contextual approach, LSUC v 
Robinson correctly stands for the proposition that Gladue principles apply to any discipline of 
Indigenous lawyers.
As with the liberty interest approach, to recognize the criminal conduct approach 
as controlling would unduly narrow the scope and potential of Gladue, as well as being 
inconsistent with the reasoning in LSUC v Robinson. Any professional misconduct or conduct 
unbecoming, even if it does not constitute criminal or near-criminal conduct, engages to some 
extent the alienation of Indigenous lawyers from the justice system.
From a black-letter-law perspective, the overlapping considerations approach seems most 
appropriate. It fulfils doctrinal consistency, a major ambition of the common law. But the 
136.  See above notes 107 and 108 and accompanying text.
137.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 73.
138.  I make this point with respect and recognize the possibility that Justice Sharpe might agree.
139.  Gladue, supra note 1 at para 61, quoted in Sim, supra note 82 at para 13.
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approach that is most purposive and true to the text and spirit of Gladue is the alienation 
contextual approach. Under both of these approaches, Gladue principles properly apply to the 
discipline of Indigenous lawyers generally.
However, since none of these four approaches explain Kokopenace and Anderson, there 
would need to be exceptions—although it is not yet clear what the criteria for those exceptions 
are. I have suggested that the ardent protection of prosecutorial discretion and the narrowness 
of section 11 of the Charter are the best explanations at present.
An alternative is a multifactorial test: That is, Gladue principles are more likely to 
apply where the applicable legal test includes considerations that overlap with criminal law 
sentencing, where the alienation of Canada’s Indigenous peoples from the justice system is 
relevant, where the liberty interest of an Indigenous person is engaged, and where the conduct 
at issue constitutes criminal or near-criminal conduct. The more approaches that apply, the 
more likely it is that Gladue principles are relevant, but none of the four are determinative 
in themselves. This test is versatile but is precarious (indeed, one might say meaningless) and 
provides unpredictable results.
There is a pressing need for appellate direction specifying which of these approaches 
should apply and clarifying the nature of the exceptions applicable in Kokopenace and 
Anderson. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada (with respect) has left appellate and trial 
courts with little to no indication of when Gladue principles are properly extended beyond 
criminal sentencing. It is thus incumbent on that court to clarify the situation, and it falls to 
appellate courts to proceed as best they can until such clarification is provided. The alienation 
contextual approach is most consistent with Gladue and the existing appellate case law and 
should be explicitly adopted by appellate courts and followed, in the meantime, by lower 
courts and tribunals.
A. Application to Lawyer Discipline
Having identified approaches that appellate courts have applied to the extension of Gladue 
principles beyond the criminal sentencing context, and having considered those approaches as 
candidate tests or elements of a test for the extension of Gladue principles, I now apply these 
approaches and tests to the specific context of lawyer discipline.
Gladue principles would apply to the professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers 
generally under the overlapping considerations approach or the alienation contextual 
approach. Gladue principles are applicable under the overlapping considerations approach 
because the relevant considerations in professional discipline overlap with those of criminal 
sentencing. Recall from Part I that, while law society discipline does not share the criminal law 
purpose of punishment, it does share the purpose of the protection of the public.140 Moreover, 
many factors are common to both criminal sentencing and disciplinary penalties, including the 
severity of the conduct, the impact on the victim, and general and specific deterrence.141 Gladue 
principles are also applicable under the alienation contextual approach because the alienation 
140.  See above notes 45 to 48 and accompanying text; Criminal Code, supra note 8, s 718, esp s 718(e).
141.  See above notes 45 to 48 and accompanying text; Criminal Code, supra note 8, ss 718 to 718.2, esp s 
718(b) [deterrence].
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of Indigenous peoples from the justice system, including the alienation of Indigenous lawyers, 
is relevant to the discipline of Indigenous lawyers.
Under these two approaches, LSUC v Robinson and Batstone were correctly decided. 
Most explicit in the reasons in LSUC v Robinson is the overlapping considerations approach: 
the applicable legal test includes considerations that overlap with criminal law sentencing, 
specifically culpability, character, and mitigating and aggravating factors. Although alienation is 
not emphasized as expressly in the reasons, LSUC v Robinson also demonstrates the alienation 
contextual approach: the lawyer felt unable to turn to the police for assistance.142 The reasons 
of the panel in Batstone were brief on the application of Gladue, but their reference to “the 
history of Aboriginal people in Canada and the ongoing effects of colonialism and racism” 
demonstrates the alienation contextual approach.143
In contrast, under the liberty interest approach Gladue principles would not apply because, 
as the appeal panel explicitly recognized in LSUC v Robinson, the lawyer’s liberty interest was 
not engaged.144 Under this approach, LSUC v Robinson and Batstone were incorrectly decided.
Under the criminal conduct approach, Gladue principles would apply to lawyer discipline 
only where the misconduct at issue constituted or approached criminal conduct. Under this 
approach, LSUC v Robinson was correctly decided—assault is a criminal offence, for which 
the lawyer was convicted—but should not have been followed in Batstone, as practising while 
suspended is not a criminal offence or near-criminal offence (although it is a provincial offence, 
albeit one for which imprisonment is not an available penalty).145
Under the multifactorial test, which combines all four approaches, it is possible but not 
obvious that Gladue principles apply to professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers, and thus 
that LSUC v Robinson or Batstone, or both, were correctly decided.
I acknowledge here the concern that Gladue principles may have inadvertent negative 
impacts in the criminal context where victims of violence are particularly vulnerable, and thus 
I leave open the possibility that in some specific circumstances of professional misconduct or 
conduct unbecoming by Indigenous lawyers, Gladue principles should not be applied or should 
be applied cautiously. The National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women 
and Girls “call[ed] upon federal, provincial, and territorial governments to thoroughly evaluate 
the impacts of Gladue principles and section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code on sentencing 
equity as it relates to violence against Indigenous women, girls and 2SLGBTQQIA people.” 
146 In parallel, where an Indigenous lawyer’s conduct has harmed Indigenous persons and 
especially Indigenous women and LGBTQ+ persons, and the future ability of the lawyer to 
practise poses danger to Indigenous persons and especially Indigenous women and LGBTQ+ 
142.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at paras 45–46, 57.
143.  Batstone, supra note 42 at para 12.
144.  LSUC v Robinson AP, supra note 42 at para 71, quoting Leonard, supra note 85 at paras 53 and 85, citing 
Sim, supra note 82 and Frontenac Ventures, supra note 83.
145.  Law Society Act, supra note 44, ss 26.1, 26.2.
146.  See National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, Reclaiming Power and 
Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls 
(Vancouver: The Inquiry, 2019), online: <https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/final-report/>, vol 1b at 185, Call to 
Justice 5.17.
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persons’ confidence in the legal profession, Gladue principles should not be applied or should 
be applied cautiously.
What about costs? The panel in Willier recognized that Gladue principles could potentially 
apply to costs awards in lawyer discipline. As with disciplinary penalties themselves, the 
lawyer’s liberty interest is not engaged, such that Gladue principles do not apply under the 
liberty interest approach. Unlike disciplinary penalties, it is unclear if Gladue principles apply 
under the overlapping purposes approach, as there is disagreement in the case law about the 
purpose of costs in disciplinary proceedings.147 In Ontario, “the general purpose and governing 
principle of the consideration of costs and who should bear them is that the financial burden 
of an investigation should not rest on the Society, generally, and its members,”148 which would 
suggest that the factors in assessing costs are different than the factors in assessing penalty. 
However, there is case law from British Columbia suggesting that costs share the purpose of 
deterrence.149 As for the alienation contextual approach, costs awards appear to have less to do 
with alienation from the justice system than do disciplinary penalties themselves.150
While the impact of Gladue principles in LSUC v Robinson and Batstone was to reduce 
the length of a suspension (LSUC v Robinson) and to substitute a reprimand for a suspension 
(Batstone), and as contemplated in Willier was to reduce the amount of a costs order, the 
emphasis in Gladue on “alternative sanctions” may lead panels to more often consider 
remedies such as restitution, where permitted by their enabling legislation.151
I ultimately conclude that the alienation contextual approach is most appropriate. Thus, 
LSUC v Robinson and Batstone were correctly decided. The applicability of Gladue principles 
to costs orders, as contemplated in Willier, is less clear.
147.  MacKenzie does not address this question: MacKenzie, supra note 13 at Ch 26, 26.18.1, pp 26-57 
to 26-59.
148.  Law Society of Upper Canada v Wise, 2008 ONLSHP 126 at para 3, [2008] LSDD No 121.
149.  See Law Society of British Columbia v Albas, 2016 LSBC 36 at para 30, [2016] LSDD No 252: “The Panel 
has concluded that, for general deterrence purposes, costs…be awarded to the Law Society.” See also Law 
Society of British Columbia v Jeletzky, 2005 LSBC 2 at paras 11–12, [2005] LSDD No 114.
150.  But see Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 159 at para 5, [2018] LSDD No 233, where the 
lawyer (unsuccessfully) argued “that costs are not allowed under Indigenous laws.”
151.  See Law Society of Upper Canada v Farmani, 2016 ONLSTH 39 at paras 5–8, [2016] LSDD No 39, 
applying Law Society Act, supra note 44, s 35(1), para 13.
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IV CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that Gladue principles properly apply to lawyer discipline. 
I have done so by analyzing the leading appellate decisions extending Gladue principles beyond 
criminal sentencing and separating out four potential approaches:
1. The overlapping considerations approach, where the applicable legal test includes 
considerations or purposes or factors that overlap with criminal law sentencing
2. The alienation contextual approach, where the alienation of Canada’s 
Indigenous peoples from the justice system, and particularly the criminal justice 
system, is relevant
3. The liberty interest approach, where the liberty interest of an Indigenous 
person is engaged
4. The criminal conduct approach, where the conduct at issue constitutes criminal or 
near-criminal conduct.
I concluded that the approach most true to Gladue is alienation contextual: Gladue principles 
apply whenever the alienation of Indigenous persons from the justice system is relevant, with 
as-yet-unspecified exceptions to account for Kokopenace and Anderson. Under this approach, 
or the overlapping considerations approach, Gladue principles would generally apply to 
professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers.
The legal community would benefit greatly from appellate direction specifying which of 
these approaches should apply, whether alone or in combination, and clarifying the nature 
of the exceptions applicable in Kokopenace and Anderson. Pending such direction, Gladue 
principles properly apply to lawyer discipline: LSUC v Robinson is binding for hearing panels 
in Ontario and persuasive in the other Canadian jurisdictions. While it can be read narrowly 
to apply only where the conduct at issues constitutes criminal or near-criminal conduct, 
a broader reading that applies it to all discipline of Indigenous lawyers is more consistent 
with Gladue itself.
The extension of Gladue principles to the professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers 
is consistent with the case law as it has developed since Gladue. More fundamentally, this 
extension is consistent with the rallying cry in Gladue and Ipeelee, echoed by LaForme JA in 
Kokopenace, to address the alienation of Canada’s Indigenous people from the justice system.
In the meantime, and in the face of this doctrinal uncertainty in the case law, there are 
other steps that can be taken to ensure or promote the use of Gladue principles in the discipline 
of Indigenous lawyers. Given that codes of conduct and legislation on the legal profession both 
say little about disciplinary penalty determination (in contrast, for example, to the sentencing 
provisions in the Criminal Code), it would be inconsistent and incongruous to add provisions 
on Gladue principles to those—although the law societies and the legislatures are free to do 
so. Likewise, purporting to issue binding directives to law society disciplinary panels (and in 
Ontario the Law Society Tribunal) could raise independence concerns. The most appropriate 
solution would be for law societies to adopt policies requiring or guidelines encouraging their 
disciplinary prosecutors to take the position that Gladue principles are applicable.
Discipline is not the determinative or even predominating component of professional 
regulation. Nonetheless, it cannot be overlooked as law societies, the legal profession, and 
the legal academy work toward reconciliation. The extension of Gladue principles to lawyer 
discipline is an appropriate step and an important component in re-evaluating the relationship 
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between law societies and Indigenous lawyers. While this is not to say that other steps will not 
be necessary,152 this extension is a moderate and incremental one. The alienation of Indigenous 
peoples from the Canadian legal system includes the alienation of Indigenous lawyers from 
the legal system and specifically from its regulators. Indigenous lawyers will be central to 
addressing alienation, and that centrality cannot be ignored if reconciliation is to be attainable 
or successful. Indeed, discipline in individual cases can have higher visibility and thus a 
greater impact on public perception of the regulation of the legal profession than deliberate 
public outreach.
152.  Consider, for example, the inclusion of Indigenous members on discipline panels for Indigenous lawyers. 
Here, see Coutlee (Re), 2018 LSBC 33, [2018] LSDD No 227, reconstituting a hearing panel to include an 
Indigenous person. Contrast Law Society of Upper Canada v Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 38, [2018] LSDD No 
55, an unsuccessful motion for recusal of two of three non-Indigenous panel members, and Law Society 
of Upper Canada v Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 46, [2018] LSDD No 63, an unsuccessful motion seeking “an 
Order appointing an Indigenous Chair to oversee an Indigenous Tribunal comprised of members of the 
Indigenous community” (at para 3). Consider also the use of sentencing circles in penalty determination: 
Law Society of Upper Canada v Robinson, 2012 ONLSHP 200, [2012] LSDD No 217.
